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Abstract
Purpose – This paper seeks to explicate a dynamic theory of competition, i.e. the resource-advantage theory of competition, with the aim of
developing a theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm of foreign production.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is conceptual in approach.
Findings – The paper develops a set of five criteria that should be met by any theory that attempts to ground the eclectic paradigm. In addition, it
demonstrates that the resource-advantage theory of competition meets all of these criteria.
Research limitations/implications – By providing a theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm of foreign production, the paper provides
researchers with a broader perspective from which to investigate multinational enterprise competition.
Originality/value – The usefulness of frameworks, such as the eclectic paradigm of foreign production, is limited when they are not grounded in
positive theories. By grounding the eclectic paradigm of foreign production, this paper enhances the paradigm’s usefulness.
Keywords Multinational enterprise competition, Eclectic paradigm, Resource-advantage theory, Production management, Resource management
Paper type Conceptual paper

Understanding how multinational enterprises compete is the
goal of much of international business research. However, due
to the complexities involved in firms competing in multiple
countries, no general theory has been able to explain fully the
mechanisms involved. Therefore, insights into multinational
enterprise (MNE) competition have been guided by various
research streams, including transaction cost analysis (e.g.
Graham, 1998, Horaguchi and Toyne, 1990), imperfect
competition (e.g. Grosse, 1985), institutional theory (e.g.
Dacin et al., 2002; Kostova et al., 2008), and
internationalization theory (e.g. Buckley, 1988; Rugman,
1982). However, one research stream, the eclectic paradigm
(or framework) of foreign production (e.g. Dunning, 1980,
1988, 1998, 2001; Dunning and Lundan, 2008), hereafter
the eclectic paradigm, has inspired a considerable amount of
research into the activities of MNEs (Guisinger, 2001).
Indeed, as Cantwell and Narula (2001) emphasize, “the
eclectic paradigm has been the leading explanation for the
growth of multinational activity over the past two decades”.
The eclectic paradigm is a unifying framework for
determining the extent and pattern of foreign direct
investment by MNEs (Dunning, 2001). It stresses that
foreign direct investments by MNEs are determined by three

sets of forces referred to by the acronym OLI (ownership
advantages, location advantages, and internalization
advantages). Ownership advantages (or firm-specific
advantages) are comprised of the capabilities and assets that
provide competitive advantages to a firm. Location
advantages delineate those advantages gained from operating
in a particular country (e.g. access to raw materials, low wage
rates, etc.). Internalization advantages are the advantages that
a firm gains by using its ownership advantages itself rather
than selling them (or making them available) to other firms.
The existence and configuration of the OLI factors influence
firms’ decisions to engage in foreign activities (Moore and
Lewis, 1999).
Early works outlining the eclectic paradigm suggest that it
could be developed into a “theory” of international
production. This is evident in early titles, such as “Toward
an eclectic theory of international production” (Dunning,
1980) (see also Dunning and McQueen, 1981; Dunning and
Norman, 1983). However, by the mid-1980s, it was being
characterized as simply a paradigm rather than a theory.
Dunning (2001, p. 176) emphasizes the belief that “No single
theory can be expected to satisfactorily encompass all kinds of
foreign-owned value-added activity”. Indeed, as the term
“eclectic” suggests, the framework is not a single theory;
rather it is a compilation of complementary and alternative
theories that together explain the level and pattern of valueadded activities of MNEs (Tolentino, 2001). However, as
Hunt and Madhavaram (2006) argue, conceptual frameworks
are more useful when they are grounded in theory. The
success of the eclectic paradigm suggests that, perhaps, there
could be discovered some systematically related set of
statements (including some law-like generalizations) that is

empirically testable, which can be used to ground the eclectic
paradigm[1]. That is, there may exist a general theory broad
enough to enable both the explanation and prediction of the
phenomena that are covered by the eclectic paradigm.
The purpose of this article is to explicate a dynamic, theory
of competition with the aim of developing a theoretical
foundation for the eclectic paradigm. Recent developments
have made such a foundation possible. First, Dunning (2003)
and Dunning and Lundan (2008) suggest that the resourcebased theory of the firm informs the eclectic paradigm.
Second, the resource advantage theory of competition (R-A
theory hereafter) has been put forth as a general theory of
competition (Hunt, 2000b). As such, R-A theory should be
capable of providing a theoretical foundation for all forms of
competition, including MNE competition.
The article is organized as follows. First, we provide a
discussion of the eclectic paradigm and develop a set of five
criteria based on Dunning (1980, 1988, 1998, 2001) that
should be met by any theory that attempts to ground
theoretically the eclectic paradigm. These criteria are argued
to be:
.
ownership advantages, location advantages, and
internalization advantages should be allowed to affect
MNE performance;
.
firms should be able to develop sustainable advantages in
resources over rivals (i.e. homogeneous, perfectly mobile
resources should not be assumed);
.
resources should be spatially transferable;
.
country specific factors (i.e. context variables) should
impact MNE competition; and
.
the theory should be capable of capturing the dynamic
nature of MNE competition (see Table I).
Second, we examine extant theories of competition in
mainstream economics to show why none provide a
theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm. Third, we
provide a brief overview of R-A theory. Fourth, we discuss RA theory’s ability to provide a theoretical foundation for the
eclectic paradigm. Specifically, we will explore whether R-A
theory accommodates the five requisites presented in Table I.
Fifth, we conclude with suggestions for further research.

The eclectic paradigm
The eclectic paradigm was developed as a holistic framework
that can identify and evaluate the significance of the factors
influencing both the initial act of foreign production by
enterprises and the growth of foreign production (Dunning,
1988). As Dunning (1980) argues, the extent to which MNEs
Table I Five requisites for grounding the eclectic paradigm
1 Ownership advantages, location advantages, and internalization
advantages should be allowed to affect MNE performance
2 Firms should be able to develop sustainable advantages in resources
over rivals (i.e. homogeneous, perfectly mobile resources should not be
assumed)
3 Resources should be spatially transferable
4 Country specific factors (i.e. context variables) should impact MNE
competition
5 The theory should be capable of capturing the dynamic nature of MNE
competition

engage in foreign direct investment rests on three
determinants:
1 the extent to which firms possess (or can gain access to)
resources (or assets) that rivals lack;
2 the extent to which it is in the best interest of firms to
internalize the resources rather than sell or lease them to
other firms; and
3 the extent to which the resources complement the
indigenous resources of the foreign countries in which
they do business.
For the eclectic paradigm, resources are manifested in
ownership advantages, locations advantages, and
internalization advantages. It maintains that MNEs often
have certain resource advantages over rivals. As Dunning
(1988, p. 2) states, “in order for firms of one nationality to
compete with those of another by producing in the latter’s
own countries, they must possess certain advantages specific
to the nature and/or nationality of their ownership”. In other
words, foreign direct investments strategies make sense only if
firms are capable of having firm-specific resource advantages
over rivals in foreign countries. As Dunning (2001, p. 175)
asserts, “a firm that makes a foreign acquisition to obtain new
and up-to-date technology or managerial capabilities
presumably does so because it believes it can use such assets
along with existing core competences in a way which will
protect or augment its competitive position”.
Ownership advantages can be viewed as resulting from
firm-specific advantages or resources (Moore and Lewis,
1999). As Dunning (1988) suggests, ownership advantages
can arise from ownership of, or access to (vis-à-vis external
markets), specific resources. Therefore, ownership advantages
depend not only upon resources generated internally but also
on the competence to seek out and harness resources
generated by other organizations (Dunning, 2001). The
eclectic paradigm suggests that ownership advantages affect
the strategies that firms use. For example, firms that have
ownership advantages over rivals in foreign markets often
chose to use a strategy of foreign direct investment (Dunning,
1998). However, the use of ownership advantages is often
contingent on other factors such as location advantages.
Location advantages result from a firm using marketplace
characteristics to its advantage. “Enterprises will engage in
foreign production whenever they perceive it is in their best
interests to combine spatially transferable intermediate
products produced in the home country, with at least some
immobile factor endowments or other intermediate products
in other countries” (Dunning, 1988, p. 4). In other words,
firms use a combination of ownership advantages and location
advantages to compete with rivals. This is consistent with the
strategy followed by many countries of developing “businessfriendly” resources (e.g. modern infrastructures, tax
incentives, etc.) in an attempt to attract investments by
foreign businesses.
Ownership advantages must complement location
advantages. Indeed, as Dunning (1998, p. 59) maintains, “it
may be preferable to think of the MNE not as a second best
substitute for the market, but as a partner with the market to
promote first-best allocative efficiency throughout and across
value chains”. Firms will choose foreign direct investment
strategies when their ownership advantages combined with
location advantages are perceived to be better than those of
rival firms. The implicit assumption here is that firms are

capable of using resources across national boundaries
(Dunning, 1988). Indeed, this premise was present early in
the development of the eclectic paradigm. For example,
Dunning (1958) argues that firms that that are more effective
at harnessing and organizing resources should be able, at least
to some extent, to transfer these advantages across national
boundaries.
Internalization advantages refer to the situation where firms
gain advantages over rivals by transferring ownership-specific
advantages “across national boundaries within their own
organizations rather than sell them, or their right of use to
foreign-based enterprises” (Dunning, 1988, p. 3). For
example, a firm may decide to build a production facility in
a foreign country rather than license the process to other firms
in that country. The eclectic paradigm suggests that firms will
internalize ownership advantages when such actions can
increase the firm’s financial performance. Although
internalization is often viewed as an efficiency choice (i.e.
from a transaction cost perspective), the decision to
internalize often revolves around the issue of control
(Moore and Lewis, 1999). Once an ownership advantage
(e.g. market knowledge) is made available to other firms (e.g.
via licensing agreements or partnerships) it becomes difficult
to maintain control over it. As Moore and Lewis (1999) note,
once the ownership advantages change hands, it is difficult for
MNEs to control what competitors dos with the process and
to ensure that they do not sell it on to other competitors at a
low price.
The dynamism of the eclectic paradigm is the result of “the
continuous and iterative interaction between OLI
configuration over successive time periods and the strategy
of firms in response to these configurations that, in turn,
influence the OLI configuration in a subsequent moment in
time” (Dunning, 2001, p. 178). Firms react to the successes
and failures of rivals. When the successes of rivals threaten to
decrease the advantages that firms enjoy, they often engage in
strategies designed to safeguard (or increase) current
advantages. These strategies, in turn, result in changes in
the OLI configurations of the firms in future time periods.
This process continues as long as rivals exist.
Given the characteristics of the eclectic paradigm, a general
theory of competition that could potentially ground the
eclectic paradigm would, at least, satisfy five requisites (see
Table I). First, ownership advantages, location advantages,
and internalization advantages should be allowed to affect
MNE performance. As Dunning (1980) suggests, firms
choose to engage in foreign direct investment when they
believe that their combinations of ownerships advantages,
location advantages, and internalization advantages will allow
them to increase their profits. Second, firms should be able to
develop sustainable advantages in resources over rivals (i.e.
homogeneous, perfectly mobile resources should not be
assumed). Firms must be capable of possessing resource
advantages over rivals sufficient enough to outweigh the costs
of servicing unfamiliar or distant markets (Dunning, 1980).
Third, resources should be spatially transferable. That is,
firms should be capable of using resources in multiple
markets. As Dunning (1988) maintains, to engage in a
strategy of foreign direct investment, firms must be capable of
transferring at least some of their ownership advantages across
national boundaries within their own firms. Otherwise,
foreign direct investment would not make sense. Fourth,
country specific factors (i.e. context variables) should impact

MNE competition. The decision of where to locate a
production facility is influenced considerably by factors such
as locally available resources, trade barriers, and/or the
formation of regional trading blocs (Dunning, 1980). Fifth,
the theory should be capable of capturing the dynamic nature
of MNE competition. That is, the theory should be capable of
explaining the relationships among ownership advantages,
location advantages, and internalization advantages over time.

The eclectic paradigm and mainstream economic
theories of competition
The neoclassical theory of competition has become the most
dominant theory of competition taught in colleges (Hunt and
Morgan, 1995). For mainstream economics, “competition”
means perfect competition, with the full array of required
conditions. For perfect competition, the firm is not
considered to be an efficient mechanism for transferring
resources across national boundaries; instead, the market is
proffered as the most efficient mechanism for such transfers
(Dunning, 1988). As a result, firms should not choose to
internalize advantages because the market will always be a
more efficient allocator of resources. Therefore, the concept
that firms would choose to internalize advantages to gain
efficiencies or advantages over rival firms is foreign to
neoclassical theory. As a result, the neoclassical theory of
competition is unable to provide a theoretical justification for
internalization advantages and, therefore, it cannot provide a
theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm.
Similarly, “new” institutional economics (NIE)
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996) cannot provide a
theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm. NIE
represents an important step in the development of a theory
of the firm (Foss, 1996). Prior to NIE, mainstream economic
theory tended to treat the firm as a “black box”, which was
not worthy of study. NIE provides important insights into the
governance structures of MNEs. However, it does not provide
a mechanism to explain how OLI advantages affect firm
performance. In general, NIE neglects the fact that firms
engage in activities designed to increase effectiveness (Hunt,
2000b). Instead, NIE focuses on firm efficiency. As Coase
(1988) concludes, NIE has tended to neglect the main activity
of a firm, i.e. running a business. As a result, it cannot provide
a theoretical basis for the eclectic paradigm.
An examination of mainstream economics reveals that no
theory of the fundamental nature of competition can provide
a theoretical foundation for the specific combinations of
general theories that comprise the eclectic paradigm. What is
required is a theory that describes the process of competition.
As Burt (1992, pp. 5-6) emphasizes:
Competition is a process not a result. With important exceptions, most
theories of competition concern what is left when competition is over. They
are an aside in efforts to answer the question of how to maximize producer
profit [. . .]. The alternative is to start with the process of competition and
work toward its results. This is a less elegant route for theory, but one that
veers closer to the reality of competition as we experience it.

An overview of R-A theory
R-A theory is a general theory of competition that describes
the process of competition, which is explicated using a
descriptive approach (Hunt and Arnett, 2001)[2]. Being a
general theory of competition, R-A theory shares affinities

with other theories. In general, it combines of heterogeneous
demand theory (Alderson, 1965) with the resource-based
theory of the firm[3]. The resource-based theory of the firm
can be traced to Penrose (1959) and Wernerfelt (1984). This
view parallels, if not undergirds, what Foss (1993) calls the
“competence perspective” in evolutionary economics and the
“capabilities” approaches of Teece and Pisano (1994) and
Langlois and Robertson (1995) (Hunt, 2000b). However, RA theory is more than a compellation of these theories.
Rather, it is the kind of “synthesis theory” called for by
Smelser and Swedberg (1994).
R-A theory defines competition as “the constant struggle
among firms for comparative advantages in resources that will
yield marketplace positions of competitive advantage for some
market segment(s) and, thereby, superior financial
performance” (Hunt, 2000b, p. 135). The key aspect of
competition, as is implied by the theory’s name, is a firm’s
ability to develop and maintain advantages in resources over
its rivals. However, to understand R-A theory one must first
have an understanding of seven fundamental components
(four basic concepts and three processes) of the theory. As
suggested by the definition of competition above, competition
involves four basic concepts:
1 resources;
2 competitive advantage;
3 market segments; and
4 superior financial performance.

a synergistic manner and lead to increases in the effectiveness
and/or efficiency of the firm, they become competencies
(Hunt, 2000b). For example, Southwest Airlines in known for
being on time, which could be considered one of its
competencies. This competence is a result of the procedures
that the firm developed to shorten the amount of time its
aircraft spend on the ground (e.g. cleaning, restocking, etc.),
the skills and knowledge of the airline’s employees, and
Southwest Airlines’ ability to motivate its employees. The
increases in efficiency have allowed Southwest Airlines to
service its routes with fewer planes than other airlines
(Feldman, 2001).
Firms can gain an advantage in resources over their rivals
because resources are significantly heterogeneous across firms
and imperfectly mobile (Hunt and Morgan, 1995; Hunt,
2000b). Although firms can possess similar resource sets, the
compilation of a firm’s set of resources is unique. That is, the
complexities of resource sets ensure that they cannot be
duplicated exactly. For example, though some resources that
firms use (e.g. computers, desks, and buildings) can be
obtained easily by rival firms, others are more difficult to
procure due to their complex natures (e.g. relationships with
suppliers and customers). As Hunt (2000b) suggests, it is the
complexity of resource sets that makes it difficult for firms to
easily trade, buy, and/or sell them (i.e. they are imperfectly
mobile). However, because comparative advantages in
resources are difficult to acquire, they can persist over time.

In addition, there are three processes that are alluded to in the
definition of competition:
1 the struggle for comparative advantages in resources;
2 the development of marketplace positions of competitive
advantage; and
3 the realization of superior financial performance.

Market segments and marketplace positions of
competitive advantage
Firms can have a comparative advantage in resources in
particular market segments – intra-industry groups of
consumers whose tastes and preferences with regard to an
industry’s output are relatively homogeneous (Hunt, 2000b).
A comparative advantage in resources occurs when a firm’s
available resources enable it to produce a market offering that
is perceived by consumers as being more valuable than rivals’
market offerings and/or enable it to produce a market offering
at lower costs than rivals. A firm’s marketplace position is
defined by its relative resource costs and the relative perceived
value of its market offerings.
A firm will have a marketplace advantage in a given
segment, if it can produce:
.
a market offering perceived as having superior value
compared to rivals’ marketing offerings at a lower cost
than rivals; or
.
a market offering perceived as having superior value
compared to rivals’ marketing offerings at the same cost as
rivals; or
.
a market offering perceived as having value equal to rivals’
marketing offerings at a lower cost than rivals.

Our discussion of the theory focuses on these major concepts.
Resources and the struggle for comparative advantages
For R-A theory, resources are tangible and intangible entities
available to the firm that enable it to produce efficiently and/
or effectively a market offering that has value for some market
segment(s) (Hunt and Morgan, 1995). At their basic level,
resources can be classified as financial (e.g. cash reserves,
access to financial markets), physical (e.g. office equipment,
production equipment), legal (e.g. contracts with suppliers,
trademarks, copyrights), human (e.g. skills and knowledge of
employees), organizational (e.g. culture, structure,
procedures), informational (e.g. market research,
competitive intelligence), and relational (e.g. relationships
with partners, suppliers, and customers). Firms need not own
a resource to take advantage of it. All that is necessary is that
firms have access to resources. Indeed, many strategic
partnerships are formed so that participating firms can gain
access to each other’s resources (Lambe et al., 2002;
Wittmann et al., 2009).
Resources can also be combined into complex or “higher
order” resources. For example, a firm’s ability to develop
innovative products can be considered a higher order resource
because it requires the firm to use a combination of basic
resources. That is, to develop innovative products a firm must
use the knowledge and skills of its employees (a human
resource), its computer equipment (a physical resource),
market research (an informational resource), and other basic
resources. If the basic resources used fit coherently together in

Firms that occupy advantaged market positions often
motivate rival firms to take action. That is, competitors that
perceive a rival firm as having a competitive advantage will
attempt to reduce the effect that the advantage has on them
(Hunt, 2000b). As Hunt and Arnett (2001, p. 22) suggest,
disadvantaged firms:
. . .attempt to neutralize and/or leap frog the advantage firm(s) by acquisition
and or innovation. That is, they attempt to acquire the same resource as the
advantage firm(s) and/or they attempt to innovate by imitating the resource,
finding an equivalent resource, or finding (creating) a superior resource.
Here, “superior” implies that the innovating firm’s new resource enables it to
surpass the previously advantaged competitor in terms of either relative
efficiency, or relative value, or both.

Firms whose innovations are spawned by rival firms’
marketplace positions or actions are practicing reactive
innovation (Hunt, 2000b). This type of innovation is
reactive in the sense that signals from the marketplace
inform firms that they occupy marketplace positions of
competitive disadvantage, which, in turn, motivates the
disadvantaged firms to take strategic actions. This
mechanism helps explain why competition is dynamic. By
competing for competitive advantages in the marketplace,
firms act as disequilibrating forces, which ensures that the
marketplace is always changing.
Adding to this dynamism, some firms’ innovativeness is a
result of their entrepreneurialistic natures. That is, they
proactively innovative. Proactive innovation “is innovation by
firms that, although motivated by the expectation of superior
financial performance, is not prompted by specific
competitive pressures – it is genuinely entrepreneurial in the
classic sense of entrepreneur” (Arnett and Hunt, 2002, p. 22;
italics in original). Entrepreneurialistic firms search constantly
for ways to improve the efficiency and/or effectiveness of their
organizations. For example, companies like 3M and Microsoft
pride themselves on their ability to integrate innovation into
their company cultures, which allows them to practice
proactive innovation.
Achieving superior financial performance
For R-A theory, the goal of firms is superior financial
performance. However, “superior” financial performance
differs from profit maximization. Although economic agents
often prefer more to less, this differs from maximizing
(Langlois, 1986). Indeed, R-A theory argues that, though
more profits are preferred to less profits, the fact of imperfect
information, among other things, prevents firms from profit
maximizing.
Because superior equates with both more than and better than, it implies that
firms seek a level of performance exceeding some referent. For example, the
specific measure of financial performance might be profits, return on assets,
or return on equity, whereas the specific referent might be the firm’s own
performance in a previous time period or that of a set of rival firms, an
industry average, or a stock-market average. Both the specific measure and
referent will vary from time to time, firm to firm, industry to industry, and
culture to culture (italics in original) (Hunt and Morgan, 1997, p. 78).

The distinction between superior financial performance and
profit maximization is important. Positing that a firm’s goal is
superior financial performance reflects the dynamism of R-A
theory, which accords well with the extant dynamism of
competition in market-based economies (Hunt, 2000b).
Positing profit maximization as a firm’s goal does not make
sense because to achieve maximum profits a firm would need
access to, among other things, perfect information about
consumers and competitors, which is not possible. Therefore,
profit maximization cannot be used as a realistic goal for
firms.
R-A theory maintains that superior financial performance is
a result of firms occupying positions of competitive advantage
in the marketplace. Positions of competitive advantage are a
result of consumers perceiving that firms’ market offerings
have superior value and/or firms’ abilities to produce market
offerings at lower costs than rivals. These advantages in the
marketplace are a result of firms having access to resources
that are superior to rivals’ resources. In other words, resource
advantages lead to positions of competitive advantage and, in
turn, superior financial performance (Hunt, 2000b).

Other factors affecting competition
R-A theory assumes that the environment in which firms
compete affects competition. Specifically, the competitive
process is significantly influenced by five environmental
factors:
1 the societal resources on which firms draw (e.g.
availability of skilled workers);
2 the societal institutions that form the “rules of the game”
(North, 1990) (e.g. cultural values and beliefs);
3 the actions of competitors and suppliers (e.g. new product
launches by rival firms);
4 the behavior of consumers (e.g. trends and fads); and
5 public policy (e.g. antitrust policies).
All of these factors have the ability to foster, neutralize, or
destroy a firm’s competitive advantage (Hunt, 2000b). For
example, firm A may enjoy a marketplace position of
competitive advantage because of the value consumers place
on its market offerings (e.g. high-quality VCRs). However,
firm B innovates and develops new market offerings (e.g.,
DVD players) based on a better technology. As a result, firm
A’s original market offerings are no longer a source of longterm competitive advantage. Firm A must now try to find a
way to neutralize (or leapfrog) firm B’s advantage (e.g. by
developing a new technology, such as Blue-Raye) and the
process continues. Add additional firms to the scenario and
the dynamics of the typical business’s environment become
evident.

Grounding the eclectic paradigm in R-A theory
Evaluating whether R-A theory is capable of providing a
theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm requires
exploring its foundational premises (see Table II). We
examine different aspects of R-A theory and show how it
meets the five criteria required to theoretically ground the
eclectic paradigm. First, we show how R-A theory meets the
first four criteria by focusing on how it views resources.
Second, we show how it meets the fifth criterion by exploring
the concept of competition and organization learning.
Table II The foundational premises of R-A theory
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9

Demand is heterogeneous across industries, heterogeneous within
industries, and dynamic
Consumer information is imperfect and costly
Human motivation is constrained self-interest seeking
The firm’s objective is superior financial performance
The firm’s information is imperfect and costly
The firm’s resources are financial, physical, legal, human,
organizational, informational, and relational
Resource characteristics are heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile
The role of management is to recognize, understand, create, select,
implement, and modify strategies
Competitive dynamics are disequilibrium-provoking, with innovation
endogenous

Note: The foundational propositions of R-A theory are to be interpreted as
descriptively realistic of the general case. Specifically, P1, P2, P5 and P7 for RA theory are not viewed as idealized states that anchor end-points of
continua
Source: Hunt and Morgan (1997)

An examination of R-A theory reveals that it provides a basis
for the existence of ownership advantages and location
advantages. R-A theory views ownership advantages as
resulting from resource advantages. That is, firms have
ownership advantages because of the relative uniqueness of
their resource sets, which, in turn, is a result of the relative
immobility of many resources (e.g. competencies). As a result,
a firm can possess resource advantages over rival firms in
foreign markets. For example, strong brand names, such as
Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, often give firms an advantage
over rivals because consumers are already familiar with the
company and its products.
Consistent with the eclectic paradigm, R-A theory
maintains that firms need not own resources to benefit from
them. Firms need only have access to resources. As Hunt
(2000b, p. 128) emphasizes:
For example, the relationships involved in relational resources are never
owned by firms, but only available to them for the purpose of producing value
for some market segment(s). Indeed, just as there is no neoclassical market –
no demand or supply curve – for “reputations,” there is no market for
relationships with suppliers, customers, employees, and competitors.
Nonetheless, relational resources have value (italics in original).

Consistent with the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 2001), R-A
theory recognizes that firms can gain access to needed
resources by forming cooperative relationships with other
firms, for example through contracts and/or strategic alliances
(Hunt, 1997a).
R-A theory also maintains that many resources are heritable
and durable (Hunt, 2000b). As such, some resources can be
transferred across national boundaries. For example,
resources, such as production and management processes,
can often be used in multiple countries because they can be
codified. However, some resources may be situation specific.
For example, the skills that a firm’s salesforce develop to meet
the needs of customers in a particular market may not transfer
to other markets because of cultural differences.
Regarding location advantages, R-A theory acknowledges
that firms are influenced by environmental factors.
Competition among firms is affected by:
.
the availability of societal resources;
.
the existence of societal institutions;
.
the actions of competitors/suppliers;
.
the behavior of consumers; and
.
public policy.
These factors will differ from country to country because
differences exist among countries’ forms of government,
natural resources, and infrastructures (Hunt, 2000b). When
deciding on whether to maintain a presence in a foreign
market(s), firms will consider how country-specific
environmental factors affect their business operations. Given
that each firm has relatively unique resource sets from which
to draw, the effects of these environmental factors will vary
from firm to firm. For example, some firms’ market offerings
will match the wants and needs of consumers (an
environmental factor) in foreign markets better than others.
Therefore, while one firm may decide to invest in a
production facility in a foreign country, other firms may
decide that such a move is unwise.
R-A theory predicts that superior financial performance in
foreign markets will result from occupying marketplace
positions of competitive advantage, which is the result of
having a comparative advantage in resources. Firms will

choose to invest directly in foreign markets if they perceive
that their firm-specific resources combined with those
available in the foreign marketplace constitute a comparative
advantage over rivals’ resource sets. In contrast, firms that
perceive themselves as being at a resource disadvantage may
choose to:
.
form partnerships with local firms (to gain access to
needed resources);
.
form partnerships with other non-local firms (to gain
access to needed resources);
.
purchase the needed resources; or
.
not enter the foreign market.
In reference to internalization advantages, R-A theory
recognized that firms are constantly struggling for
comparative resource advantages (Hunt, 2000b). As a
result, a firm’s choice between using its proprietary
resources itself (i.e. an internalization strategy) versus
making its resources available to other firms will be
determined by an evaluation of which strategy will enable it
to develop a resource advantage over its rivals. For example, a
firm may decide to license its technology to another firm to
raise capital that can be used for other projects, which, in
turn, provide advantages over rivals. Or, firms may form
partnerships with other firms to gain access to each other’s
resources. For example, firm A may allow firm B to sell its
products because firm B has access to markets that firm A
does not. In these circumstances, the firm believes that the
benefits derived from obtaining access to additional resources
outweigh the risk of losing control of proprietary resources.
In summary, R-A theory meets the first four criteria that are
necessary if it is to provide a theoretical foundation for the
eclectic paradigm. First, it accommodates ownership
advantages, location advantages, and internalization
advantages and explains how these advantages affect MNE
performance. Second, R-A theory advances that resources can
be relatively immobile and, therefore, it explains how firms
can maintain long-term resource advantages over rivals.
Third, it recognizes that some resources available to firms can
be used across national boundaries. Fourth, it acknowledges
that firms are affected by external environmental factors and
that these factors may vary from country to country.
Dynamic MNE competition
The dynamism of the eclectic paradigm is the result of “the
continuous and iterative interaction between OLI
configuration over successive time periods and the strategy
of firms in response to these configurations that, in turn,
influence the OLI configuration in a subsequent moment in
time” (Dunning, 2001, p. 178). OLI configurations of firms
can be affected by a number of factors, including:
.
technological/organizational innovations;
.
changes in the composition of senior management;
.
increases in labor productivity;
.
new marketing techniques; and
.
mergers and acquisitions (Dunning, 2001).
These factors, like strategic responses from rivals, can have a
profound effect on the effectiveness/efficiency of current OLI
configurations, which, in turn, affects the strategies that firms
choose to follow in the future and, ultimately, future OLI
configurations.
R-A theory views competition as a dynamic process. Given
that the objective of firms is superior financial performance,

firms seek a level of performance that exceeds some referent
(e.g. a specific profit level or a certain return on equity). At
any given point in time, firms can assess their financial
performance (e.g. by comparing projected profits with actual
profits for a given time period). The firm’s financial
performance “signals” to the firm its relative market
position, which, in turn, signals relative resources (Hunt
and Morgan, 1996). As a result, firms can understand how
their current OLI configurations are performing in the
marketplace. Poor performance indicates that the current OLI
configuration needs modification. In contrast, superior
performance signals that current OLI configuration is
superior to rivals’ configurations and that the firm should
make an effort to maintain (or enhance) its current OLI
configuration. In addition, R-A Theory explains the role that
environmental factors (i.e. societal resources, societal
institutions, competitors/suppliers, consumers, and public
policy) play in competitive dynamics. Therefore, R-A theory
explains the dynamism outlined by the eclectic paradigm and,
therefore, meets the fifth criterion necessary to provide a
theoretical foundation for the eclectic paradigm.

MNE competition, R-A theory, and the eclectic
paradigm
Many criticisms have been leveled against the eclectic
paradigm and whether the OLI framework can continue to
be useful given the drastic changes that have occurred
concerning globalization. While some researchers suggest that
the eclectic paradigm is dead and should be replaced with a
better theoretical perspectives (e.g. Mathews, 2006), other
researchers suggest that the eclectic paradigm needs to be
adapted to still be useful (e.g. Guisinger, 2001, Madhok and
Phene, 2001, Tolentino, 2001). However, as Dunning (2001,
p. 183) maintains:
The essential postulates of the eclectic paradigm still remain intact and valid
irrespective of the motive for MNE activity, its extent, pattern and form still
rest on the interaction between the O-specific advantages of investing firms –
including the willingness and ability of such firms to access new assets and
coordinate these with their existing assets – and the advantages of countries
and also on relative costs and benefits of engaging in this interaction by
alternative modes of governance and noticeably that of administrative fiat
(i.e., I advantages).

Dunning (2001) suggests it is not so much a case of extending
or adapting the eclectic paradigm as much as finding
complementary theories that can work side-by-side with it
to explain MNE competition.
R-A theory, because it is a general theory of competition, is
capable of providing a broader view of MNE competition
than the eclectic paradigm. As a result, it can be used to
examine how factors not covered by the eclectic paradigm
(e.g. path dependencies) affect MNE behavior. In addition,
R-A theory provides a theoretical foundation that can be used
to understand how certain concepts and theories interact with
and affect those included within the eclectic paradigm. As a
result, R-A theory may be capable of expanding our
understanding of a number of areas relevant to MNE
research. For example, R-A theory contributes to our
understanding of firm diversity (Hunt, 2000b), incorporates
the resource based view of the firm (Hunt, 2000a, Hunt and
Morgan, 1995), incorporates the competence view of the firm
(Hunt, 2000a, b), explicates the effects that public policy
decisions have on competition (Hunt and Arnett, 2001),

makes the proper prediction regarding financial performance
diversity (Hunt, 2000b), explicates that competition is both
efficiency seeking and effectiveness seeking (Hunt and
Duhan, 2002), argues that firms can have an alliance
competence (Lambe et al., 2002; Wittmann et al., 2009),
provides a theoretical framework that integrates the dominant
theories of business strategy (Hunt and Lambe, 2000),
constitutes a phylogenetic, non-consummatory, evolutionary
theory of firm behavior (Hunt, 1997a, b; Hunt and Morgan,
1996), grounds endogenous growth models (Hunt, 1997b),
recognizes the existence of path dependencies (Hunt and
Morgan, 1996), grounds market segmentation strategy (Hunt
and Arnett, 2004), and explicates how business strategy can
contribute to social welfare (Hunt and Arnett, 2006).
Consider an example of how R-A theory can be used, in
conjunction with the eclectic paradigm, to gain insights into
MNE competition. The eclectic paradigm provides guidance
as to what factors affect whether a firm decides to engage in
foreign direct investment strategies. As Dunning (1980)
emphasizes a firm will engage in foreign direct investment if:
.
it possesses resources that rival firms lack (O advantages);
.
it is in the best interest of the firm to internalize the
advantages (I advantages); and
.
the firm’s resources complement those of the foreign
country (L advantages).
R-A theory, as shown previously, supports the concepts of O
advantages, L advantages, and I advantages. In addition, R-A
theory provides additional predictions concerning foreign
direct investment strategies. For example, R-A theory can be
used to help explain under what conditions OLI advantages
will lead to sustainable competitive advantages for MNEs.
R-A theory maintains that OLI advantages are the result of
the unique resource sets available to firms. As R-A theory
emphasizes, competitors can neutralize a firm’s resource
advantage by:
.
purchasing the same resources as the advantaged firm;
.
imitating the advantaged firm’s resources;
.
developing strategically equivalent resources; or
.
developing strategically superior resources (Hunt, 2000b).
Therefore, MNEs can experience sustainable competitive
advantages if the resources that provide the OLI advantages
are:
.
difficult to imitate;
.
not easily substituted for; and
.
not easily traded among firms.
According to Hunt (2000b, p. 142), “the major characteristics
affecting the lifespan of an advantage are mobility, complexity,
interconnectedness, mass efficiencies, tacitness, and time
compression diseconomies”.
Advantages that rely on mobile resources, which are
resources that are easily bought and sold in the marketplace,
are often neutralized quickly and effectively by rival firms
(Hunt, 2000b). For example, firms can develop advantages
over rivals by adopting new technologies, such as state-of-theart manufacturing equipment, before rivals do. However,
rivals can quickly negate these types of advantages by
adopting new technologies themselves. Therefore,
advantages realized from mobile resources are normally
short-lived.
In contrast, advantages that stem from complex resources
are generally longer lived. For example, Barney (1992)

discusses socially complex resources, which are described as
those “that enable an organization to conceive, choose, and
implement strategies because of the values, beliefs, symbols,
and interpersonal relationships possessed by individuals or
groups in a firm” (p. 45). Socially complex resources (e.g.
trust, teamwork, and firm reputation) involve combinations of
multiple, often interconnected resources (Hunt, 2000b).
Socially complex resources may require a considerable
amount of time and effort to develop (i.e. they involve time
compression diseconomies) and, in some cases, are not a
source of competitive advantage until they reach a “critical
mass”. For example, firm reputations, such as ones for high
quality products or excellent service, lead to competitive
advantages only after a large number of consumers believe in
their veracity. Dierickx and Cool (1989, p. 1506) describe this
phenomenon in terms of stocks and flows:
The fundamental distinction between stocks and flows may be illustrated by
the “bathtub” metaphor: at any moment in time, the stock of water is
indicated by the level of water in the tub; it is the cumulative result of flows
of water into the tub (through the tap) and out of it (through a leak). In the
example of R&D capability, the amount of water in the tub represents the
stock of know-how at a particular moment in time, whereas current R&D
spending is represented by the water flowing in through the tap; the fact that
know-how depreciates over time is represented by the flow of water leaking
through the hole in the tub. A crucial point illustrated by the bathtub
metaphor is that while flows can be adjusted instantaneously, stock cannot (italics
in original).

As a result, advantages stemming from socially complex
resources tend to be difficult to neutralize because of the time
needed to increase the “stock” of the resource.
Some resources are difficult to neutralize because they tend
to be tacit (e.g. core competencies) and, therefore require
time to master. Polanyi (1957) maintains that when one
acquires a skill, one also acquires a corresponding
understanding that defies articulation (i.e. tacit knowledge).
Tacit resources are ones that rely on tacit knowledge and,
therefore, are non-codifiable and must be learned by doing
(Hunt, 2000b). For example, Lambe et al. (2002) suggest that
some firms can develop an alliance competence, which is an
organizational capability for securing, developing, and
managing alliances (i.e. they tend to be more successful at
forming alliances). An alliance competence relies heavily on
tacit knowledge. In fact, as Lambe et al. (2002, p. 145) note,
developing an alliance competence is such a hands-on
learning experience that firms should expect some of their
initial attempts to fail. They suggest that to facilitate the
development of an alliance competence firms should
experiment with less complex alliances and then slowly
progress to more complex ones.

these advantages affect MNE performance. Second, R-A
theory advances that resources can be relatively immobile
and, therefore, it explains how firms can maintain long-term
resource advantages over rivals. Third, it recognizes that some
resources available to firms can be used across national
boundaries. Fourth, it acknowledges that firms are affected by
external environmental factors and that these factors may vary
from country to country. Finally, R-A theory helps explain the
dynamism of the eclectic paradigm.
As Hunt (2000, p. 80) suggests, “R-A theory is a work in
progress, and much conceptual and empirical work remains to
be done”. This article represents an initial step toward
investigating R-A theory’s ability to explain MNE behavior.
We have shown that R-A theory does provide a theoretical
foundation for the eclectic paradigm. However, the eclectic
paradigm is not the only theory that MNE researchers have
found useful. Therefore, future research should focus on
whether R-A theory is consistent with other successful
approaches explaining MNE behaviors. Potential approaches
include:
.
internationalization theory (Buckley, 1988; Rugman,
1982);
.
classical trade theory (Ricardo, 1817, Smith, 1961);
.
regional integration theory (Balassa, 1961; Eden, 2002);
.
factor proportion theory (Hecksher and Ohlin, 1933);
.
institutional theory (Dacin et al., 2002; Kostova et al.,
2008); and
.
product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966; Wells, 1968).
Comparisons of these approaches to that of R-A theory may
yield additional insights into MNE competition and will also
provide a more thorough examination of R-A theory as a
general theory of competition.

Notes
1 This sentence draws on Rudner’s (1966) definition of a
theory.
2 The overview presented here is extremely brief. For a
more thorough discussion of the theory see Hunt (2000b).
3 It should be noted that R-A theory does more than just
incorporate concepts from these theories. It also integrates
and extends them. For example, while R-A theory adopts
a resource-based view of the firm, it does not view the
process of competition as an equilibrium-seeking process
as do many resource-based theorists (see Schulze, 1994).
Instead, it maintains that firms seek superior resources,
which promotes disequilibrium in the marketplace (Hunt,
2000b).

Conclusion
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